

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Security and rule of law

Organisation	Date	Reporting Period
Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Bujumbura (Burundi)	August 2015	2014

Activity		2014	Implemented by		Rio marker		Gender marker
Number	Name	Actual expenditure	Name Organisation	channel	mitigation/adaptation	significant/principal	significant/principal
23844	SSD Programme - Phase 2 ODA	1.071.458	GIZ - Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit	Research institute and comp	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
24710	Appui Finances Publiques	270.422	IMF	Multilateral organization	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
25345	APPNB - Appui a la Professionalisation de la Police Nationale du Burundi	202.667	CTB - Cooperation Technique de la Belgique	Government	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
25605	Legal action press law	966	CNIDH - Comm. Nat. Indep. des Droits de l'Homme	NGO	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
25851	Project Support Fund - Institutional Assessment of HealthNet TPO Burundi	23.070	Moore Stephens	Research institute and comp	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant

Activity		2014	Implemented by		Rio marker		Gender marker
Number	Name	Actual expenditure	Name Organisation	channel	mitigation/adaptation	significant/principal	significant/principal
26015	Appui aux medias burundais	975.480	La Benevolencia	NGO	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
26337	PRAPPNB	301.722	CTB - Cooperation Technique de la Belgique	Government	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
26636	Basket Fund UNDP	988.000	UNDP	Multilateral organization	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
26696	Schools for Democracy	200.386	IMD	NGO	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
26697	Program Support Fund	108.254	Consultant Group	Research institute and comp	Not applicable	Not applicable	Significant
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Result Area 1	**Human Security**					
Result Question 1.1a: To what extent did security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole provide services that serve the needs of (various social groups within) society? (outcome, country-level)	The general security situation throughout Burundi remained relatively unchanged in the course of 2014 and can be classified as 'adequate'. It is generally safe to travel throughout the country and security issues mostly relate to common crimes such as robbery, burglary, etc. occasionally accompanied by organised violence. Incidents with armed groups was reported occasionally, notably in the border area with DRC and mostly in the form of robberies of trucks at night. These incidents were usually quickly countered by the deployment of extra police and army personnel in the affected areas. However the incidence of violence between civilians remains high in the society as a whole. Violence is mostly committed by civilians against civilians, often in the form of theft, domestic violence or over land conflicts. Violence by security forces against civilians occurs at a relatively low incidence and typically takes the form of cases of intimidation or abuse of power for economic transactions. The appreciation by the population of its security forces slightly decreased between 2013 and 2014. A new security perception report - CENAP 2ieme edition with updated information. became available in October 2014. Note: for several of the indicators used below progress is ranked on a scale of 1 to 7: 1 = very poor, 7 = excellent. This scale is used where quantitative or					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Incidence of armed violence on annual basis has decreased: level of violent crime (GPI, score from 1=good to 5=poor)	3 (2012)	2	3	3	2.42	Vision of Humanity (Global Peace Index)
Indicator 2: Violent deaths per 100.000 population has decreased	21.7 (2008)	18	8.0	n.a.	5-10	UNODC
Indicator 3: % of population perceiving their security situation as 'good' or 'very good'; (male/female)	89% (2011)	90% (male) 80% (female)	n.a.	n.a. (* report due mid-july 2014)	83,0% (male) 85,5% (female)	Biannual security perception survey CENAP 2ieme edition avril-juin 2014
Indicator 4: General appreciation for security forces by the population (x/10) (army / police)	7.5 (army) (2011) 5.8 (police)	8.0 (army) 7.0 (police)	n.a.	n.a. (* report due mid-july 2014)	8,1 army 5,9 police	Biannual security perception survey CENAP 2ieme edition avril-juin 2014 p.58 schaal van 1-10

Result Question 1.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme-level)	2014: It is now observed that the number of cases of extra-judicial killings has dropped to 2 (!) in the first 6 months of 2014. The total number of reported HR violations decreased but the % in which armed forces were involved increased (10.8% - 2012; 13.7% - 2013). It is not clear why this occurred. As in 2013, during 2014 the NL Embassy kept up sustained pressure on GoB authorities to take action on impunity for extra-judicial killings. The role of the National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH) is improving but remains weak. As the mandate of the UN (BNUB) in Burundi drew to an end by 31/12/2014 it is necessary to reinforce the role of CNIDH to monitor HR violations. The NLs SSD programme financially supports the 'Observatory on Armed Violence' (AOAV) which started to produce reports on incidence of armed violence. Its first report was presented on 4/7/2014 but data collection methods still need to be improved.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Number of reported cases of extra-judicial killings by state security forces	63 (2011)	0	31			UN report
Indicator 2: Number of cases opened / verdicts issued against staff of state security forces implicated in extra-judiciary killings	8 / verdicts n.a. (2011)	all	26 / 5	27 / 7		UN Report
Indicator 3: Number of reported Human Rights violations by security forces and armed groups, as compared with total (deaths + wounded).	n.a. Total: 912 (2011)	0	144 (sec. forces) 137 (armed groups Total: 1327	161 (sec. forces) 137 (armed groups Total: 1173		APRODH
Indicator 4 : CNIDH (national human rights commission) is undertaking mapping and monitoring of HR abuse, due to NL support (score 1=poor, 7=good)	1/7	5/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	CNIDH Annual Report

More indicators

Result Area 1	Human Security					
Result Question 1.2a: Is there progress in developing a functioning and coherent security sector as a system? (outcome, country level)	Basic elements for the security sector are in place: the army has barracks, uniforms and basic equipment. In 2014 operational capacity was hampered by a lack of transport capabilities and funds. Also, specialized material (e.g. for peace keeping operations abroad) was largely absent. Progress on the development of the legislative setting was limited with the preparation of a new Organic Law faltering. The strategic Defense Review was completed. At the close of the second phase of the Security Sector Development (SSD) programme and the start of the combined phases 3 and 4 in October 2014 it is clear that Burundi's security providers, but equally so the security sector controllers (e.g. parliament, Ombudsman, civil society, etc.) are still in need of capacity enhancement to fully execute their respective roles. Generally speaking army staff is adequately trained on aspects of gender and human rights. The National Police (PNB) still lacks adequate police infrastructure and financial means for effective operations at local and provincial level. The number of female staff continues to increase slowly. Security sector staff is paid regularly. Steps were taken to see the National Security Strategy that was prepared in 2012 translated into detailed action plans for the individual institutions. The role of the National Security Council in monitoring the implementation of the strategy and in coordinating between the various security sector institutions improved, but is still far from adequate. Meetings of the main coordination platform for the security sector organizations (Groupe Sectoriel) were					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Security sector institutions have officers who are sufficiently trained (incl. on the gender aspects of their work)	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	Min Defense Min Securite Publique
Indicator 2: Personnel within the security sector (incl. police) are paid salaries on a regular basis	6/7 (2011)	7/7	6/7	6/7	6/7	Min Defense Min Securite Publique
Indicator 3: Number of female police and security staff has increased (army/police)	n.a.	700/26.000 (army) 1.000/16.000 (pol)	239/26.000 (army) 465/16.000 (pol)	252/26.000 n.a.	250/26.000 (army) 676/16.000 (police)	Forces de Defense Nationale Police Nationale de Burundi
Indicator 4:The security sector institutions have sufficient infrastructure (barracks, equipment) (x/7)	3/7 (army) 1/7 (police)	5/7 (army) 4/7 (police)	3/7 (army) 1/7 (police)	3/7 (army) 2/7 (police)	3/7 (army\) 2/7 (police)	Min Defense Min Securite Publique

Result Question 1.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)	The NL SSD programme (see Result Fiche DSH for financial project details) is the main donor support programme to the security sector of Burundi. Nearly all donor funds for training of army staff, and most funds for training of police staff derive from NL. The SSD programme also supported (limited) buidlings and equipment. Mid-2013 the SSD programme organised a planning exercise for support activites in the period 2014-2017. More than 100 staff of all relevant organisations (e.g. ministries, army, police, parliament, Ombudsman, constitutional court, etc,) and donors participated. An analysis was made of strengths and weaknesses, and an overview was made of objectives, intended outputs and activities which formed the basis for the combined phases 3 and 4 of the SSD programme. This combined phase started in October 2014. The role of the formal coordination platform, the 'Groupe Sectoriel de Securite', and that of the National Security Council (CNS) as overall coordinator for the sector remains in need of strengthening.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Promotion of multi-institutional/ multi-donor (budget) support plans and projects.	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	5/7	4/7	SSD Programme
Indicator 2: Training for security sector staff	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	SSD Programme
Indicator 3: Infrastructure provided (barracks, equipment)	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	SSD Programme
Indicator 4: A strategic plan for the entire sector has been promoted by the key ministries	3/7 (2011)	7/7	5/7	5/7	5/7	SSD Programme

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Result Area 1	Human Security					
Result Question 1.3a: To what extent are separate security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole internally and externally accountable for their performance? (outcome, country level)	The year 2013 saw a slight increase in the number of parliamentary questions asked and answered, concerning security sector issues. Mostly these questions related to the budgets for the ministries of Defense and Public Security. The answers received were typically non-exhaustive and in a few cases reference was made to the need for secrecy as a means not to answer. On the other hand, the introduction of a new organic law on the police was heavily debated in national assembly and senate and many recommendations were adopted in the final version of the law (which is still to be approved - June 2014). Army and police are have recommenced with the recruitment of staff and candidates are required to go through screening processes to test their suitability. Out of many hundreds of candidates only 100-150 are hired. The internal control mechanisms of the army are in fairly good shape. Incidents where army staff are involved in human rights abuses are not frequent, and when this does occur the army takes steps and brings almost all presumed perpetrators before an internal commission. For the police the situation has improved slightly with respect to 2012 in the sense that more often investigations were conducted against misbehaving police officers: In many cases presumed perpetrators were temporarily suspended, but were allowed relatively soon to return to their duties (e.g. Businde incident). When police staff is produced before justice, cases are often dismissed because of lack of witnesses (or retraction of earlier witness statements out of fear). Rarely any additional effort					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Security sector institutions are accountable to external actors, such as parliament, public	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	3/7	3/7	Government of Burundi Parliament Press: local newspapers (IWACU, Renouveau)
Indicator 2: Security sector institutions have personnel adequately screened and fairly recruted.	1/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	3/7	3/7	Government of Burundi Forces de Defense Nationale Police Nationale du Burundi
Indicator 3: Security sector institutions have internal accountability mechanisms in place and functioning (army/police)	3/7 (army) (2011) 1/7 (police)	6/7 (army) 4/7 (police)	5/7 (army) 2/7 (police)	5/7 (army) 3/7 (police)	5/7 (army|) 3/7 (police)	Forces de Defense Nationale Police Nationale du Burundi
Indicator 4: Control mechanisms for non-state security providers have been developed and included in national legislation.	0/7 (2011)	4/7	0/7	1/7	1/7	Government of Burundi

Result Question 1.3b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)	The SSD programme and the NL embassy kept up a continuous dialogue with the Government of Burundi (GoB) on the follow-up given to four cases of extra-judicial killings. A sanction was imposed in november 2012 on a small part of the SSD programme when information on these four cases was not forthcoming. In the course of 2013 both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Public Security, following NL pressure, provided comprehensive information on the follow-up given, showing that the cases were in the hands of the justice system. As a result, the sanction was conditionally lifted in Februari 2014. In 2014 the army and police, with the assistance of the SSD programme, consistently continued actions against staff suspected of misbehaviour, demonstrating an improvement in internal accountability mechanisms. At the initiative of GoB an analysis was done of corruption within army and police by the Transparency International Defense and Security Programme (DSP). The fact that GoB itself (Min of Good Governance, Min Defense and Min Public Security) initiated this activity should be seen as a good sign of improvement of external performance evaluation, and of willingness to improve. In 2014 TI-DSP continued monitoring the security sector for its Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2015.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: The existence of internal performance evaluation systems.	1/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	Forces de Defense Nationale Police Nationale du Burundi
Indicator 2: Organised gender sensitive community dialogues and parliamentary hearings	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	3/7	3/7	Government of Burundi Parliament (senate & assemblee)
Indicator 3: Vetting programmes for security sector personnel have been promoted	2/7 (2011)	4/7	2/7	3/7	3/7	Forces de Defense Nationale Polcie Nationale du Burundi
Indicator 4: The existence of external performance evaluation systems	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	4/7	4/7	Government of Burundi

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Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 1	Human Security
B. Results achieved as planned Reasons for result achieved:	In general, progress on human security in 2014 was as could have been expected, even when considering that progress on the introduction of new organic laws for army and police, as well as on the approval of documents coming out of the Strategic Defense Review, has been slower than desired. Overall good progress was made in training of army and police staff on ethics, gender, and e.g., internal accountability. The slow progress on legislative development was due to the fact that the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Public Security were relatively weak figures which meant that they delayed taking decisions until the backing of the President, or of the informal 'Council of Generals' around the president had been obtained. In most cases where delays in strategic developments in the sector occurred, a breakthrough was achieved due to NL influence following intensive lobbying by the SSD Programme Director and/or embassy and finally as a trade off between inputs that are desirable to GoB (e.g. infrastructure investments by the SSD programme) against advancement on structural security sector issues (e.g. setting aside maintenance budgets for buildings). Conduct of the Burundi army (FDN) in reaction to the political tensions and demonstrations in Burundi since end April 2015 is seen as having had a mitigating effect on the present circumstances. Many feared these circumstances could have been far worse than the situation as it developed until ultimo August 2015. The Netherlands' SSD programme is credited with contributing to the FDN's professional conduct.
Implications for planning:	The approach taken by the NL between 2012 and 2014 pays off and progress is made. The trainings provided to army and police appear to be effective in increasing the level of ethics, although serious problems remain with corruption notably in the day-to-day activities of the police force. Continuing these type of trainings will further serve to (gradually) keep improving the level of professionalism of army and police staff. Political pressure (dialogue by embassy) coupled with practical consequences (sanctions or benefits) must be continued to keep GoB to adhere to its own stated objectives with regard to the future vision and near-term achievables for the security sector. 2014 saw the start of the combined phase 3 and 4 of the SSD programme which forms the basis of the NL aid 2014-2017. In 2014 and beyond this framework will be used to monitor progress on 15 key indicators, and apply sanctions or reward benefits as deemed appropriate. It is expected that this monitoring framework will serve to put sustained pressure on GoB to stick to agreed deliverables As of August 2015 the political and security situation in Burundi has changed dramatically. As a result the army and police pillars of the SSD programme have been suspended until further notice and the on-going governance pillar will be revised.

Result Area 3	Inclusive Political Processes
Result Question 3.1a: To what extent are the political and peace processes within the target area of your programme effective and inclusive?	During 2014 the ruling political party, the CNDD-FDD, continued its preparations for the elections of 2015. At national level the GoB, spearheaded by the Minister of the Interior continued its active policy of dividing opposition political parties by recognizing only those wings of the opposition parties which had an CNDD-FDD friendly leader. The GoB also continued intimidating the current leaders of the (non-recognised wings of the) main opposition parties with the aim to hinder their public appearances and (possibly) to make them ineligible for running as presidential candidates in 2015 because they could be formally brought before the justice system at any time. The youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, the Imbonerakure, were seen to march through the streets of almost every city in Burundi, shouting intimidating slogans at the general population and specifically opposition youths. In a limited number of cases violent clashes between opposing youth groups ensued. The police and national intelligence service (SNR) were involved in increasingly suppressive actions against all forms of political manifestations, both in public as well as in private (e.g. disturbing meetings at bureaus of opposition parties). The probity and integrity of the CNDD-FDD is questionable, but opposition parties do not appear to perform much better. Leaders are typically interested primarily in securing or enhancing their own stature and that of their party, rather than having a vision for the good of the whole nation. Public trust in a fair election process in 2015 declined as evidenced by media reports and interviews with informants. GoB jobs are mostly given to CNDD-FDD affiliates leading to much frustration with political opposition. During 2014 this strained political climate

	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Source
Indicator 1 : Increased trust in the political or peace process by different groups (1=poor; 7=good)	n.a.. (2011)	5/7	3/7	2/7	1/7	UN reports Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau) informants
Indicator 2 : Level of probity and integrity of political bodies.	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	2/7	1/7	Transparency International IDEA
Indicator 3 : Diversity (sex, religion, geographical representation, ethnicity, political parties) in representation in important institutions (lawmaking bodies, executive power, army, justice institutions)	3/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	2/7	2/7	UNDP HDR Worldbank CPIA Freedom House
Indicator 4 : Presence of political and social conflicts (extent to which conflicts between parties are resolved peacefully/reduction in violent incidents between groups)	5/7 (2011)	6/7	4/7	2/7	1/7	GoB UN reports, UNODC Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)

Result Question 3.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	Together with the other EU member states, NL continued an intensive political dialogue with GoB through scheduled meetings (Art 8) as well as ad-hoc dialogue. NL stressed the importance of political inclusivity in order to curb growing political discontent and used the visit of president Nkurunziza in early 2014 to transmit its growing concern. Unfortunately, GoB repeatedly denied that the political situation in Burundi showed cause for alarm. In the SSD programme attention was given to training army and police on their inherently neutral role in geenral and during elections and the pre-electoral period in particular. The NL/BEL cofinanced police project continued to train police staff at selected locations on the principles of 'Police de Proximite' so that this system of local consultations over security issues via the 'Comite Mixte de Securite' (CMS) could further take root. There are still dangerous misconceptions about the role of these CMS, leading to a GOB minister actively encouraging the youth wing of the ruling CNDD-FDD to take security matters into its own hands and thus prompting them to organise vigilante-style neighbourhood watches. A dangerous development that could jeopardise the willingness of large parts of the population to work with the new policing system.

	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Source
Indicator 1: Number of people and groups involved in peace dialogues and related processes (horizontal/vertical)	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	NGO project reports
Indicator 2 : Number of districts where improved mechanisms ('Police de Proximite' & 'Comite Mixte de Securite') for interaction between government, groups and citizens are functioning.	0 (2011)	50	4	6		Ministry of Public Security BTC project reports
Indicator 3 : Number of peace processes in which gender related aspects or perspectives are taken into account.	n.a. (2011)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	UNIFEM
Indicator 4 : Participation in elections is promoted.	1/7 (2011)	7/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	UN project reports media

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Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 3	Inclusive Political Processes
C. Results achieved poorer than planned Reasons for result achieved:	The elections in 2015 cast ahead an ominous shadow with an impact on the events of 2014: poltical intolerance increased, intimidations and outright obstruction of opposition political gatherings increased as a result of the GoB/CNDD-FDD activities. In spite of heavy political pressure, GoB continued its divisive tactics in order to secure a 2015 electoral win in parliament. The main reason for this excessively restrictive handling of the policital space appears to be that the 'Council of Generals' surrounding the President fears that their positions of power, wealth and impunity (for crimes committed during the civil war) stand to lose with any reduction of the current political dominance of the CNDD-FDD. Hence they reason that all must be put in motion to win the elections of 2015 and secure the political dominance of the CNDD-FDD and President Nkurunziza.
Implications for planning:	NL will continue its poltical dialogue with increased intensity in the run-up to the elections of 2015. Increasingly NL will indicate to GoB that elections, including a pre-electoral period in 2014 and 2015, which are not considered credible by the international community as a result of serious intimidations and interference in opposition poliitcal parties by the GoB may be cause for sanctions on the NL support programme. The annex D of the Memorandum of Understanding between BUR and NL specifically mentions the elections as an indicator to measure the progress of the BUR-NL cooperation, and also mentions the possibility of financial consequences. In the SSD programme a component is foreseen to update army and police training w.r.t. election security. In practical terms the SSD programme will support several activities to monitor and (hopefully) increase political space, e.g. supporting an observatory of violence (including political violence) as well as a monitoring mechanism for political manifestations. At political level, embassy staff will engage with leaders of all political parties, both ruling and opposition, as well as with the leaders of the associated youth wings, in order to stress the need to continue with the political process however fragile and flawed it may still be, and avoid violence.

Result Area 4	Legitimate and Capable Government					
Result Question 4.1a: To what extent are government institutions better able to perform their core tasks, in your programmes target area?	Both the ministry of Defense and of Public Security have multi-year strategic plans in place, and prepare annual plans to implement these. Lack of funds however impedes the GoB from making major strides forwards in enhancing the service delivery by all government branches. Although present throughout government, notably in the police corruption remains a significant hindrance as does favoritism and impunity. Overall, the army performs well and has reasonably adequate planning capacity in place. However, for the army too funds are a limiting factor with respect to service delivery and operational capacity remains low. In 2014, a slight improvement in budget presentation and discussion in parliament could be noted. Note: for several of the indicators used below progress is ranked on a scale of 1 to 7: 1 = very poor, 7 = excellent. This scale is used where quantitative or statistical data is not available, or where multiple factors contribute to the overall status of the indicator. The ranking awarded reflects the perception of the responsible staff officer of the Netherlands Embassy in Bujumbura, on the basis of her/his knowledge, understanding and insight of the respective topic.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1 : Perception by civilians that the quality and quantity of basic government services has improved	2/7 (2011)	4/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)
Indicator 2 : Government (at national, regional, local level) is actively pursuing and implementing plans to broaden the provision of basic services (education, health, housing, transportation, employment)	3/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	UNDP HDR
Indicator 3 : The budget has been approved by parliament in time.	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	Parliament
Indicator 4 : Government is increasing its revenues as a proportion of GNP.	6/7 (2011)	7/7	5/7	4/7	3/7	IMF Worldbank

Result Question 4.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	The NL SSD programme has been instrumental in strengthening GoB planning capacities in the security sector by means of leading the responsible GoB officials through structured analytical and strategic development processes, for instance in the Defense Review exercise. In addition, the large scale planning workshop for the next years of the SSD programme (2014-2017) which took place in july/august 2013 served as a sector-wide analysis and planning tool on the basis of which the GoB strategic plans and policies for both the ministry of Defense and of Public Security could be better prioritised in 2014. NL also pushed the ministry of Public Security and the National Security Council (CNS) to convene meetings of the Groupe Sectoriel de Securite, which is the main coordination and monitoring platform for security sector development. This has helped to strengthen the coordinating mandate of the CNS.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1 : Number of meetings with stakeholders	0 (2011)	10	4	4	4	Groupe Sectoriel de Securite Ministry of Public Security National Security Council
Indicator 2 : Number of government officials trained (by sex, age,social groups, etc.)	15.000 (2011)	45.000	20.000	41.000		SSD Programme
Indicator 3 : Defense Review is completed and implemented with NL strategic advice; Sector-wide defense policy is developed and implemented with support from SSD programme.	4/7 (2011)	7/7	4/7	4/7	4/7	Ministry of Defense SSD Programme
Indicator 4 : Security policy for public security sector is developed and implemented by Min Pub Sec with support from SSD programme.	1/7 (2011)	6/7	2/7	4/7	4/7	Ministry of Public Security SSD Programme

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Result Area 4	Legitimate and Capable Government					
Result Question 4.2a: To what extent has the transparency of the government improved in your programme's target area? And is corruption being addressed?	In 2014 Burundi had a limited relapse in the Global Corruption Perception Index, both in terms of ranking as well as in absolute score. In a parallel development Burundi relapsed in the WB Doing Business ranking from position 150 (was 140 but "Last year's rankings are adjusted") to 152. However, it's DTF - Distance to Frontier slightly improved with 1.13 points, from 49.94 to 51.07. The distance to frontier score aids in assessing the absolute level of regulatory performance and how it improves over time. This measure shows the distance of each economy to the frontier, which represents the best performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. This allows users both to see the gap between a particular economy's performance and the best performance at any point in time and to assess the absolute change in the economy's regulatory environment over time as measured by Doing Business. An economy's distance to frontier is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the frontier.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1 : There is transparency in the budgetary processes (formulation, allocations, monitoring of expenditure)	5/7 (2011)	6/7	5/7	4/7	4/7	Worldbank Doing Business report Transparency International
Indicator 2 : There are effective arrangements for protecting office holders who signal fraud and corruption (regulation for whistle-blowers).	0/7 (2011)	3/7	0/7	0/7	0/7	Transparency International
Indicator 3 : Anti-corruption policy is in place and is implemented.	1/7 (2011)	4/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	GoB Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)
Indicator 4 : Position of Burundi in global Corruption Perception Index ranking.	rank: 172 (2011) score: 19	rank : ... score : 30	rank : 165 score : 19	rank : 157 score : 21	rank: 159/175 score: 20	Transparency International - CPI

Result Question 4.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	The NL SSD programme stimulated the Ministry of Defense to increase the number of budgetlines in the 2014 budget. The suggestion to do this was accepted by the Minister of Defense, however was subsequently rejected by the Minister of Finance. In the framework of indicators (Annex D to the Memorandum of Undertsanding between NL and BUR) the number of budgetlines for the ministries of Defense and Public Security was included as a indicator for the development of transparency, which implies that the Ministry of Defense must increase its budgetary transparency, or risk being affected by financial sanctions in the SSD programme. Public Finance Management capacity improved marginally as a result of the continuing implemntation of the General Strategy on Public Finance (SGFP). NL supports this activity in which several elements of PFM are targeted at the same time.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1: Greater accountability achieved within the respective target areas.	3/7 (2011)	6/7	3/7	3/7	3/7	Embassy
Indicator 2 : % NL contribution to common fund for PFM reform.	n.a.	10%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	IMF/Worldbank project report
Indicator 3 : Implementation of the General Strategy on Public Finance (SGFP) is on course.	3/7 (2011)	6/7	3/7	4/7	3/7	GoB, SGFP reports

More indicators

Result Area 4	Legitimate and Capable Government					
Result Question 4.3a: Has progress been made in supporting democracy, in your programme's target area?	Similar to 2013, 2014 was a difficult year for democratic processes in Burundi. The approaching elections in 2015 (presidential, parliamentary, provincial, district and communal) cast a dark shadow ahead. The ruling party CNDD-FDD continued its resolve to strengthen its near absolute grip on power and employed intimidating tactics to thwart the political ambitions of the opposition. Internal divisions in the opposition parties were actively induced using the powers of the Minister of Interior and leaders of opposition parties became more and more subject to intimidation through legal procedures as well as by obstruction of their possibilities to travel the country and meet with supporters. Divisions between the opposition and ruling party deepened. The UN attempt to counter this trend by organizing an agreement on a 'Roadmap' towards the elections of 2015 did not work out as hoped. Many of the recommendations were ignored by GoB who co-signed the agreement. Youth wings of the political parties engaged in public displays of force and in a few cases this led to violent clashes. The youth wing of the ruling party, the Imbonerakure, were reportedly involved in intimidating activities towards the general population too. These youth wings do not present a strong participation mechanism for youth in the democratic process however, as the youth organisations are mostly there to support the affiliate party with practical issues (security, organisation of meetings) rather than being part of the political ideological development of the respective party.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1 : Citizens, men and women, including those from minority groups, can equally participate in decision-making processes	3/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	3/7	3/7	IDEA NGOs informants
Indicator 2 : Political parties, including those in the opposition, engage in substantive development discussions	1/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	1/7	1/7	informants Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)
Indicator 3 : Participatory role of youth in democratisation process has increased	2/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	informants Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)

Result Question 4.3b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	Through its political dialogue with GoB and with key political figures NL exerted pressure to safeguard the political space in Burundi. Annex D of the Memorandum of Understanding was signed between NL and BUR in which specfically the credibility and fairness of the upcoming elections were included as a criterium for measuring progress towards the principles of the SSD programme. The NL clearly demonstrated that failure to have credible elections could have repercussions for development funding to the SSD programme (and other activities in the police sector). It is hoped that this threat will have an impact and will deter GoB from limiting the political space any further, ahead of elections. The SSD programme supported several activities through which the national police was trained in the rights and duties relating to public manifestations. Within the SSD programme a specific activitiy to engage with youth was initiated. The SSD programme further supported the National Accounts Bureau (Cour des Comptes) to stengthen its operational capacity in the preparation and calculation of the national budget.					
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Indicator 1 : Number of activities geared towards youth and minorities	0 (2011)	2	0	1	2	Embassy SSD Programme
Indicator 2 : Improvements made to national budgeting proces.	1/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	3/7	3/7	GoB SSD Programme

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result area 4	Legitimate and Capable Government
B. Results achieved as planned Reasons for result achieved:	2014 continued to show mixed results with respect to Legitimate and Capable Government and Democracy in Burundi. On the one hand GoB continued to take steps to strengthen standard planning and budgeting procedures (medium term planning frameworks, annual plans for ministries, national budget submitted better on time), including in Public Finance Management, which should lead to better transparency and control of public expenditures. The impression remains that although on paper steps are taken that would strengthen the legitimacy and capability of GoB, the vested interests of key figures, including of the president and his entourage of generals, is such that in practice serious problems of corruption and poor management of public funds continue to occur with near impunity. With respect to democracy 2014 was a year of increasingly strained relationships between the political parties and saw an upsurge of un-democratic behaviour by the ruling party and GoB.
Implications for planning:	NL will continue to apply a policy of firm political dialogue in full liaison with the other EU member states. This includes (threatening with) sanctions, applying them if necessary whilst at the same time offering incentives for GoB if political space is opened. Also, through the SSD programme and other bilateral aid projects NL will support activities to monitor political violence and political space, in an effort to have solid data on which the political dialogue with GoB can be pursued whilst also hopefully trying to deter political actors and the GoB from undertaking actions that would close the political space even further. It is difficult however to identify triggers (sanctions or stimuli) that would have an impact on the vested powers, which are not personally affected by e.g. reduction in development aid. Additional measures to itarget these 'powers behind the scenes' should be sought.

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Result Area 1 (remaining indicators)	Human Security					
Result Question 1.1a: To what extent did security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole provide services that serve the needs of (various social groups within) society? (outcome, country-level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5: Incidence of rape and gender based violence against specific social groups in society has decreased (women / LGBTI)	6.8 (2008)	6.5	n.a.	n.a.		UNODC
Extra indicator 6: Presence of police and state security personnel across the territory vs. non-state armed groups has increased (score 1=poor, 7=good)	5/7	7/7	6/7	6/7	5/7	GoB statistics
Extra indicator 7: Number and presence of non-state armed groups (incl. street gangs, organised crime, militia) has decreased (either through relocation or dissolution)	5/7	7/7	4/7	3/7	2/7	Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau) / GoB statistics
Extra indicator 8: Incidence of violent acts against specific groups in society (political affiliation) has decreased	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.		Observatoire de la Violence Armee (OVA) report

Result Question 1.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme-level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5: Number of security sector staff trained with NL support to participate in peacekeeping missions by UN/AU (army/police)	1600 / 0 (2008)	25.000 / 500	15.000 / 0	20.000 / 0	2.292 / 0	GoB statistics (Min Defense / Min Public Security)
Extra indicator 6: Confidence in the local police	83% (2011) 82% (2009) 78% (2008)		no records	no records	59%	Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who have confidence in the local police, n=1000)
Extra indicator 7: Feeling safe walking alone at night	65% (2011) 63% (2009) 60% (2008)		no records	no records	43%	Gallup World Poll (Percentage of respondents(n), who feels safe walking alone at night, n=1000)
Extra indicator 8: Security Apparatus	7,5 (2005)		7,4	7.7	7,4	Fragile State Index (Scale of 0 = very sustainable and 10 = very high alert)

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Result Area 1 (remaining indicators)	Human Security					
Result Question 1.2a: Is there progress in developing a functioning and coherent security sector as a system? (outcome, country level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5: The security sector as a whole, rather than individual institutions, is responsible for the formulation of the security sector policy.	1/7 (2011)	7/7	3/7	4/7	4/7	Conseil National de Securite
Extra indicator 6: A Strategic Plan for the entire security sector exists.	2/7 (2011)	7/7	4/7	5/7	5/7	Conseil National de Securite
Extra indicator 7: A structure for dialogue between the various institutions, incl. civil society, is functioning.	1/7 (2011)	6/7	2/7	3/7	3/7	Min Securite Publique, civil society
Extra indicator 8: The budget for the security sector is proportionally divided over the various institutions.	1/7 (2011)	4/7	1/7	1/7	1/7	Min Finance, Min Defense, Min Securite Publique

Result Question 1.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5: Measures taken by a programme to ensure salaries paid regularly and reliably to police and security personnel.	not an issue	not an issue	not an issue	not an issue	not an issue	SSD Programme
Extra indicator 6: Inclusion of civil society in security sector is promoted	2/7 (2011)	6/7	4/7	5/7	5/7	SSD Programme
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

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Result Area 1 (remaining indicators)	Human Security					
Result Question 1.3a: To what extent are separate security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole internally and externally accountable for their performance? (outcome, country level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

Result Question 1.3b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5: Legislation and procedures in place for civilian oversight	4/7 (2011)	6/7	4/7	4/7	4/7	Government of Burundi
Extra indicator 6: Number of people having attended 'Open Days' organised by army and police	0	10.000 (army) 10.000 (police)	3.500 (army) 500 (police)	n.a.	3.050 (army) 4.000 (police)	Forces de Defense Nationale Police Nationale du Burundi
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

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Result Area 3 (remaining indicators)	Inclusive Political Processes					
Result Question 3.1a: To what extent are the political and peace processes within the target area of your programme effective and inclusive?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5 : Horizontal inclusiveness in political and peace processes: relevant groups are involved (sex, religion, geographical representation, ethnicity, etc.).	2/7 (2011)	5/7	3/7	2/7	2/7	Press)local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau) informants
Extra indicator 6: Effective freedom of press, public gathering and functioning of civil society organisations	6/7 (2011)	7/7	4/7	3/7	2/7	GoB Press (local newspapers IWACU, Renouveau)
Extra indicators...						
Extra indicators...						

Result Question 3.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicators...						
Extra indicators...						
Extra indicators...						
Extra indicators...						

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Result Area 4 (remaining indicators)	Legitimate and Capable Government					
Result Question 4.1a: To what extent are government institutions better able to perform their core tasks, in your programmes target area?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

Result Question 4.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5 : The 'Friends of OBR' group has effectively influenced GoB to pursue further advances in revenue collection. (1=poor; 7=good)	n.a.	5/7	4/7	2/7	3/7	Office Burundais de Recettes (OBR) Friends of OBR meeting reports
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

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Result Area 4 (remaining indicators)	Legitimate and Capable Government					
Result Question 4.2a: To what extent has the transparency of the government improved in your programme's target area? And is corruption being addressed?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator 5 : Govt has set up joint govt procurement cell and has adequately reviewed procurement laws and procedures	1/7 (2011)	5/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	GoB
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

Result Question 4.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?						
	Baseline	**Target 2017**	**Result 2012**	**Result 2013**	**Result 2014**	**Source**
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						
Extra indicator...						

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